This appendix provides supporting figures and tables for the main paper. The section titles in this appendix correspond to those of the paper, while the subsection titles are descriptive of the appendix content.
high-rise public housing was built, 5 community areas which were proposed but rejected by the CHA, and 9 community areas proposed but rejected by the City Council. 1 The table shows that the sites that were chosen were in neighborhoods with a higher proportion of African-American residents, lower median income, higher population density, and that were closer to the Central Business District (CBD) than the sites that were rejected. Table 2 displays the predicted probability of a neighborhood containing high-rise public housing in 1990 based on a probit using only the percentage of African-American households and the percentage of households below the poverty line as explanatory variables. The estimate is from the sample of 68 neighborhoods that did not contain low-rise public housing. Seven of the eight neighborhoods with high-rise public housing have the highest propensity scores, illustrating the fact that neighborhoods with high-rise public housing have quite different characteristics than those without high-rise public housing.
Why Matching Neighborhoods Will not Work: Lack of Common Support

Lack of Correlation Between Crime and Public Housing Closure
The left panel of Figure 1 plots the average homicide rate between 1991 and 1998 against the year the first high-rise was closed in that census block. The right panel of Figure 1 plots the 1999 violent crime count in the census blocks containing closed buildings in each year between 1999 and 2008. It is evident that there is not a strong correlation between violent crime rates before the Plan for Transformation and the timing of building closure implemented through the program. Figure 2 shows of histogram of the change in the number of homicides from two years prior to the year of the first high-rise closure to the year prior to the first high-rise closure. The fact that the distribution is roughly symmetric around zero indicates that homicides were just as likely to have fallen in the years prior to the first high-rise closure as they were to have risen. Table 3 lists all family CHA developments, indicates whether the development contains high-rise buildings, the year of construction, and the number of units the development has, broken down by the community area in which the units are located. all neighborhoods in Chicago. The most salient features of these distributions are that the homicide rate in high-rise neighborhoods was much higher than for the city as a whole, and the mean homicide rate declined starting around 1990, with a large compression in the distribution for high-rise neighborhoods. Table 4 presents a number of robustness specifications for the local effects of high-rise closures on homicide. Column (3) repeats the preffered specification shown in column (5) of Main Paper Table 2 for ease of comparison. Column (1) through (6) differ only in the way the standard errors are clustered.
Public Housing Developments
Homicide Distribution over Time
Local Effects on Homicides: Robustness
Columns (1) through (4) cluster by progressively large geographical areas: census block, census tract, community area, and police precinct. Columns (5) and (6) cluster based on the high-rise block that is nearest and on policy regime, respectively. We define a policy regime to hold as long as the number of high-rise units in the block (or in the nearest high-rise block) remains constant. This corresponds to the level at which the identifying variation occurs. It is important to note that the choice of clustering does not have affect our conclusions. Throughout the remainder of the paper we take the "conservative" approach, and cluster by community area as the resulting standard errors are slightly larger than the other clustering options.
Column (7) of Table 4 is the same as column (3) except that the sample has been limited to only the blocks that contained high-rise public housing in 1990. The coefficient on high-rise units falls slightly but remains statistically different from zero. The implied direct effect of high-rise closures on homicides drops slightly from a 2.8% reduction to a 2.2% reduction in homicides per year.
Column (8) through (10) of Table 4 , are the same as column (3) except that the exclude particular high-rise developments and any block within 0.5 miles of those developments. Column (8) excludes the ABLA, Henry Horner, and Cabrini-Green developments, whose tenants were party to law suits aimed at halting or slowing demolitions. Excluding these "law suit" developments causes the coefficient on number of high-rise units to rise slightly and has no impact on the other coefficients. It does not appear that these development, which are possibly more politically organized, are driving the results. Columns (9) and (10) repeat the same exercise, but drop only the Cabrini-Green, and Robert Taylor developments, respectively. Again, the coefficients change only slightly. The results do not appear to be driven by Cabrini-Green (the development that probably has the highest land value) or Robert Taylor (the largest development). The results also hold in specifications in which the explanatory variables are interacted with development occupancy rates from 1990. 2
Column (11) of Table 4 shows results of a conditional fixed effect Negative Binomial count data model rather than OLS. 3 Column (12) shows the results of another conditional fixed effects Negative specifications yield results that are similar to the OLS results, though slightly larger in magnitude.
Column (13) of Table 4 has two differences from column (1): It uses tract as the geographic area rather than block, and it uses a sample that goes from 1970 to 2011. Estimates from this longer sample period imply a direct effect of high-rise public housing closures that is slightly larger (-53 versus -40) than the tract level specification shown in column (1) in Main Paper Figure 5 shows histograms of the distance moved after two years for each of the three groups. Figure 6 shows census blocks where displaced high-rise households were living as of 2011, the end of the sample period. The Figure reveals that they were dispersed farther to the west on the Westside, and farther to the south on the Southside. Table 6 presents estimates from regressions testing the assumptions of the BRT specification. If housing markets are indeed too thin for households to pick the specific block within a block group to which they move, then observable characteristics of the census blocks should not be predictive of an increased probability of receiving displaced households relative to the surrounding block group. The dependent variable in each of the 12 different conditional fixed effect logistic regressions in Table 6 is an indicator of whether the census block received any displaced households from high-rise census blocks. Each regression conditions on block group fixed effects, and each column features a different explanatory variable listed in the column heading. Additionally, each regression includes the number of housing of units in the census block as a control since blocks with more housing units should mechanically have a higher probability of receiving displaced households. Table 6 shows that in the sample of block groups with no low-rise public housing units, census block characteristics are not predictive of whether the block receives displaced high-rise public housing households above what is predicted by the number of housing units in the block. In contrast, in block Poisson, Negative Binomial models allow for differences in the mean and variance of the dependent variable.
How Far and Where Displaced High-rise Residents Moved
Tests of Assumptions Required for BRT Specification
groups that have low-rise public housing units, the proportion of housing units that are owner-occupied and the proportion of the population that are African-American are both predictive of which block within the block group will receive displaced high-rise public housing residents. In the final column, the explanatory variable is an indicator of whether low-rise public housing is present in the census block.
As expected, the presence of low-rise public housing in the block is predictive of whether displaced high-rise households move to that particular block within the block group. Table 7 show more detailed results from the BRT specifications than space constraints permit in the main paper. While Table 7 is shown mainly for the purpose of assessing the validity of the displacement effects estimated in Table 5 , it is encouraging to note that the estimates of the direct effects in Table 5 and Table 7 are, for the most part, quite similar. The biggest differences are for gang related and drug crimes. For these two crimes the direct effects measured in Table 7 are actually larger in magnitude.
Full BRT Estimates
The nearby effects are also quite similar in Tables 5 and 7 . The estimates for burglary, theft, and vandalism become smaller in magnitude in Table 7 , while the estimates for trespassing and truancy and curfew become larger in magnitude in Table 7 .
Overall, the estimates of the total effects are slightly smaller in magnitude using the BRT specification than they are when using the BFE specification. For most crime types, the conclusions that we draw from the total effect remain unchanged. We still find that overall the high-rise demolitions are associated with large reductions in city-level homicides, shots fired, and vice and prostitution. The biggest change is for gang activity, which changes sign from an increase in city-level gang activity as estimated in the BFE specification to a decrease for the BRT specification. However, neither of these estimates are statistically different from zero.
Although we do not present the results, we also estimated a specification that added log distance to the nearest block in which displaced households from high-rise public housing had moved interacted with the number of displaced households currently living in that block. We did this for blocks within a half-mile of any block where displaced households moved to (outside of the high-rise blocks) at any point during the sample period. While the sign on this coefficient was negative for most crime types, indicating that increases in crime correlated with the arrival of displaced households dissipated as distance to the block increased, none of the coefficients were statistically different from zero. The additions to the displacement effects implied by this extra explanatory variable were not economically large either. In fact, for most crime types the total effect changed only slightly, while the increases in the standard errors were, in some cases, more pronounced. However, we are concerned that the coefficient on this additional explanatory variable is not particularly well-identified, as it must rely on variation coming from blocks within a half mile but outside of the block group in which block i is located (since block group * year effects are included). Note: Twenty neighborhoods with the highest predicted probability of containing high-rise public housing estimated by probit using the percentage of households below the poverty line in 1990 and the percentage of African-American households in 1990 as explanatory variables on a sample of the 68 community areas that do not contain low-rise public housing. Marginal effects (confidence levels) are 0.321 (0.002) for percent under the poverty line and -0.067 (0.080) for percent African-American. Note: Total number of units as of 1990 for each non scattered-site, non city-state family development broken down by community area. High-rise indicates whether the development contained any high-rise buildings. 1991-2011 1991-2011 1991-2011 1991-2011 1991-2011 1991-2011 1991-2011 1991-2011 1991-2011 1991-2011 1991-2011 1991-2011 1970- 
